Fusion in self as a concept (#9)
I am around 7 years old; my brother tells me that I am selfish. It follows a disappointment he experienced with me.
Somebody gave me (or us? – too long ago to be certain) four pretzels’ sticks and I didn’t want to share them with him. It ended up in a skirmish and a deep cut in my left arm; running away from him, my arm went through the door’s window of our family house, which by the way is an excellent course of action in order to establish a strong emotional memory (hospital – family drama).
End result for my self-image = reinforcement of a self-representation, “I am a selfish person”.
Looking at it with my actual comprehension, another version of this same event could have been: since I had no way at the time to feel “unique and special” (a universal narcissistic need: to be seen through at least one significant other’s eyes, a parent preferably) in my environment, getting treats without having to share them with others may have been a way to get a glimpse at that wished experience, somebody is specifically giving something to me – it means that I have an existence of my own.
And again, this event and the resulting subjective constructions could be related through many other stories. Which one is true? None… (You certainly know my opinion on this by now). But one version of this story will stay as an “emotional knowledge” (or a schema in Young’s theory: in this case, the Defectiveness schema) – “I am a selfish person”. This was worsened by the fact that for Catholics, selfishness is a sin.
Lets look at this conceivable interaction. On one side, my brother who has always been generous is rightly disappointed of my “selfish” behavior. On the other side, my need to feel at last special to someone; this gift was intended to me. Then the clash follows. I am 7 years old and don’t have yet the capacity to step back and look at the situation from a sound judgment viewpoint. I counterattack in order to avoid staying with that “I am selfish” version of myself: I show my injury to my brother and say, “Look at what you have done to me” (I try to move from a selfishness to a victim version) – but deep inside the most meaningful version remains “I am selfish”, and consequently unlovable (Defectiveness schema). For many years, fierce counteractive measures didn’t change that version of myself; deep inside, I believed it was the true version of my story[1].
So, that complex interaction situated at the junction of each of our unique personal history until then created a specific significant event (marked by emotional intensity), a form of imprint in our emotional brain. I identified with that image of myself even if many other versions of myself could have been available (I would have needed some adult help to do so). For example, I didn’t take into account that it was the strong attachment to my brother that made his comment so important to me; I was at risk to lose a rare opportunity for bounding[2].
“I am a selfish person” is a self-representation; “my brother is generous” is an other-representation. As I emphasized, these representations are the end results of many interactions and interpretations of a very young child whose perspective was age-limited. But they remained as a fact; this is what I essentially am. Acceptance and Commitment therapy (ACT) would call this self as a concept. In this case there is a fusion between a conceptual description and what I consider to be myself. There is no account of the processes and contexts that influenced a seven years old child to conclude that he is a selfish person. And, moreover that self-definition became in itself a reality with which the child had henceforth to live with; selfishness being a sin, the child that I was had to take all means possible to become a generous person. Behaviorists would say that this “I am selfish” proposition had acquired a stimulus function of its own, a tricky operation of language – I would interact with it as I would with a real object. Another option could have been since I am condemned to bear that aching definition, just as well act in coherence with it and get some benefits from selfishness!
Feeling selfish or saying that to somebody else has to refer to some interaction having happened at some point. It doesn’t exist on its own. There had to be at least one person expecting something from another person who didn’t give the expected response. It would be emphasized if many persons end up with a shared frustrated expectation towards the same person. I think somewhere that experiencing shame about feeling selfish is an emotion that has to do with group cohesion (evolutionist perspective), more than with a person’s essence. The shameful person may try to amend in order to comply with the group consentient pull.
The conceptual self may be an important human illusion – from multiple mirroring feedbacks (distorted by the reflectors themselves which reflect through their own constructions), we construct a conceptual model of who we are and we firmly believe it describes a reality. That’s my personal understanding of this famous Buddhist’s sentence, “Ego doesn’t exist”. Ego is absolute construction, sand castle that could be blown at any moment by the wind or washed out by the sea (frequent poetic metaphors), but appears to us as a fixed stable house.
[1]I am convinced that the construction of the Defectiveness schema didn’t rest on this sole event, but it constitutes what certain theorists call a model scene – it somewhat synthetizes many experiences under its umbrella (I remind that memory is construction).
[2]While writing the Pretzels’ story between my brother and I, a whole chapter of memories from the past re-emerged. In my precedent posts I wrote how I felt alone in my family. But I had forgotten how my brother was an island through my solitude. This was complicated by my competitiveness and my jealousy towards him (tow other defects!), but it remained anyway a very important relationship. I realized this when he got married: while going to bed that night, I was quite surprised to find myself sobbing for long minutes, a shooting message informing me that I was experiencing a very significant loss.
This is another example of narrative construction. This re-introduction of lost memories obliges the author to modify the version of his story. And, do you think the author is always conscious of all the important elements? We are at least missing conscious information from 0 to 3 years old. And it wouldn’t be extravagant to think that many significant experiences happened there (simply think to attachment theory). Moreover, many post-3 years old events are not part of our conscious memory.
pcousineau 
I think that we all want to be a part of XXXX and that we all fell separated from XXXX. wich one is the biggest illusion?